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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jorge Alberto Lopez-Orozco appeals from his judgment of conviction for three
counts of first degree murder. Mr. Lopez-Orozco was found guilty at trial and the district
court imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences.

On appeal, Mr. Lopez-

Orozco contends that the district court erred in finding that his brother was an
unavailable witness and therefore allowing his testimony from the preliminary hearing
transcript to be read into evidence. Mr. Lopez-Orozco further contends that the district
court erred in permitting hearsay evidence in the form of an unsworn written statement
allegedly adopted by his brother to be read into evidence. This Reply Brief addresses
the State's assertions that the claims are not preserved and that any error is harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Lopez-Orozco's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in ruling that Jose Lopez-Orozco was an unavailable
witness and then admitting his preliminary hearing testimony?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing Jose's unsworn declaration to be read to the
jury?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Ruling That Jose Lopez-Orozco Was "Unavailable" As A
Witness At Trial And Then Admitting His Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Introduction
At trial, the State called Jose Lopez-Orozco to testify to a conversation he
overheard between the defendant and his brother and sister; however, Jose testified
that he did not recall any such statements. When asked, Jose testified that maybe the
reason he did not remember the statements made was due to the length of time that
this was an "emotionally
10-18.) The State successfully sought to have Jose
his preliminary hearing testimony could

8.

" (Trial Tr., p.2018,
"unavailable" such that

read to the jury.

The District Court Erred In Ruling That Jose Lopez-Orozco Was "Unavailable" As
A Witness At Trial And Then Admitting His Preliminary Hearing Testimony
The State asserts that Mr. Lopez-Orozco's arguments concerning Jose's

unavailability are unpreserved. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) The State is incorrect.
First, the district court held a hearing on Jose's unavailability, which would have
been entirely unnecessary if Mr. Lopez-Orozco was not objecting to the introduction of
his preliminary hearing testimony. (Trial Tr.,~Q.2016, L.18 - p.2018, L.19.) Following
the offer of proof, the district court specifically addressed the question of unavailability
and found Jose unavailable. (Trial Tr., p.2023, L.22 - p.2024, L.7.) Even assuming that
Mr. Lopez-Orozco did not specifically object, the error is still preserved because it was
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specifically addressed.

The Idaho Supreme Court's Opinion in State v. Ouvalt, 131

Idaho 550 (1998) is instructive:
Preliminarily, we note that the State argues that this issue may not be
raised on appeal because it was not raised to the trial court. This Court
has held that ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Sandpoint Convalescent Servs. Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare,
114 Idaho 281, 284 (1988). An exception to this rule, however, has
been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided
by the trial court. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 356-57
(1990). In the case at bar, the trial court stated that "[d]efendant contends
that he was illegally arrested when he was handcuffed and patted down ....
The handcuffing during this investigatory stop was a reasonable means to
execute the investigatory stop." Since this issue was directly addressed by
the trial court below, we will decide this issue on appeal.

Id.at 553. Because unavailability was argued to and decided by the district court, the
claim is preserved on appeal.
Second, the claim is preserved. When the State then asked Jose to be declared
unavailable, counsel for Mr. Lopez-Orozco asked the court to make a distinction
between a refusal to testify and an inability to recall. (Trial Tr., p.2021, Ls.1-3.) The
district court recognized this as an objection to the finding of unavailability, stating,
[i]n this case, I am inclined to agree with the State, and I think Mr. Ratliff
really was simply asking that the Court do distinguish this case from [... ]
Ba reel/a 1, where in fact the Court of Appeals in that case had indicated
that before the Court could find a witness unavailable or refusing to testify,
the Court in that case did have to bring the defendant back into court and
order the defendant to testify under the threat of possible contempt of
court proceedings.
In this situation, though, where the claim is a lapse of memory rather than
a refusal to testify, I agree with the State.
(Trial Tr., p.2021, Ls.24 -

p.2022, L.14.)

Later, counsel for Mr. Lopez-Orozco

specifically asserted that he did not want the preliminary hearing testimony admitted.
Counsel asserted, "we have a lapse of memory and corroboration, so I think that is the
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issue." (Trial Tr., p.2032, Ls.4-8.) Counsel then requested that the preliminary hearing
testimony be marked as an exhibit for the appellate record, because "I don't want it
admitted." (Trial Tr., p.2043, Ls.23-24.)
On appeal, Mr. Lopez-Orozco is also asserting that "lapse of memory" is the
issue, and that the district court erred by finding the lack of memory asserted by Jose to
be adequate to show unavailability. Because this issue was specifically addressed by
the district court, and the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony was objected
to, Mr. Lopez-Orozco's claim of error is preserved.

C.

The District Court's Error In Admitting Jose's Preliminary Hearing Testimony Was
Not Harmless
The State asserts that any error in the admission of Jose's preliminary hearing

testimony was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.17-22.) The State is incorrect.
In State v. Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified for all future appeals the
standard to be employed in appellate review. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-228
(2010). The Perry Court chose to use the test provided for in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967).

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 ("In Idaho, the harmless error test

established in Chapman is now applied to all objected-to error.").
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reiterated the test, explaining,
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional
violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a
reversal is necessitated, unless the State prove-s "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."

1

State v. Barcel/a, 135 Idaho 191 (Ct. App. 2000).
5

State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 221
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.)

The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear

Chapman is the proper test to be used when evaluating objected-to errors.
The purpose of a harmless error rule is to block setting aside convictions for
small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of
the trial." State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111 (1979) (internal quotations omitted). In
determining whether an evidentiary error affected the defendant's substantial rights, the
appellate court considers a number of factors,
including the importance of the witness' testimony to the prosecutor's
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and
the overall strength of the prosecution's case.

State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, ___ , 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014) (quoting State v.
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 366 (2010)).

If a substantial right is not affected, the

reviewing court may deem an abuse of discretion harmless. Parker, 334 P.3d at 814.
Mr. Lopez-Orozco contends that the errors were not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Lopez-Orozco only has
the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho
at 222. The State cannot show that "the error[s] complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In this case, Jose's preliminary hearing testimony was vitally important to the
prosecution's case. The prosecutor relied on Jose's anticipated testimony even when
giving her opening remarks:
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One last thing. He did admit to committing this crime to his family ... Jose
recalls in his indications to law enforcement that he [Jorge] indicated he
killed his girlfriend and the children and that he then burned them in his
car.
(Trial Tr., p.1056, Ls.21-22, p.1057, Ls.8-11.)
The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the importance of Jose's testimony to the
State's case in her closing statements:
Jose Aurelio Lopez-Orozco knew some details.
He knew that the
defendant had seen a patrol car. He knew that the defendant has
successfully eluded this man following him.
But Jose Aurelio also knew that Becky and the boys were there. Jose
wrote in his statement, which was read to you, the defendant admitted he
killed Becky and the kids. He was sad and desperate. He killed Rebecca
because she threatened to tell that patrol car, tell that policeman that he
was holding her against her will. Oh, and if that wasn't good enough, she
threatened to throw one of the kids out of the moving car. So he became
upset with her and shot her. He then took her body in the car and burned
them. And Jose stated, "Jorge didn't tell me anything specific about how
he killed the kids." But those are all of the details that Jose Aurelio LopezOrozco knew in August of 2002.
(Trial Tr., p.2796, Ls.3-22.) The prosecutor further highlighted the importance of Jose's
preliminary hearing testimony and unsworn statement: "Now, according to Jose Aurelio,
the defendant again knew Becky and the boys had been killed." (Trial Tr., p.279, Ls.1113.) Finally, she summarized Jose's knowledge for the jury, "Jose Lopez-Orozco. The
defendant said he shot Rebecca. He said he took her body and burned it in the car. He
did not give details about the children. That is what Jose Aurelio knew in 2002." (Trial
Tr., p.2807, Ls.6-10.)
Ultimately the prosecutor referenced Jose's testimony or written statement four
separate times during her closing remarks; this is not the kind of treatment the State
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would give to information that is cumulative or insignificant in light of all of the other
testimony and evidence adduced at trial.
Jose was the sole witness whose preliminary hearing testimony and unsworn
statement linked Mr. Lopez-Orozco to the death of Becky and the children.

Jose's

preliminary hearing testimony and his unsworn statement was not cumulative evidence
where Jose was the only witness through whom the State introduced evidence that
Mr. Lopez-Orozco confessed to killing Becky and the kids.
The only evidence truly contradicting Mr. Lopez-Orozco's version of events came
in the form of Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and in his unsworn statement, which
told a far different story, and ultimately purported to be Mr. Lopez-Orozco's confession
to the killings-where no evidence that Mr. Lopez-Orozco confessed to causing the
deaths was admitted at trial prior to the admission of Jose's preliminary hearing
testimony and unsworn statement, and no evidence that Mr. Lopez-Orozco confessed
to causing the deaths was admitted into evidence following Jose's preliminary hearing
testimony and unsworn statement. Although the State relies on the testimony of Balvina
and Maria Garcia to demonstrate the "harmlessness" of the admittance of Jose's
preliminary hearing testimony and unsworn statement, Balvina testified that while
Mr. Lopez-Orozco did come to her house, he said that someone had followed him
because "he wanted the girl," that shots were fired at him, and that a police car followed
him but did not stop him.

(Trial Tr., p.2112, L.7 - p.2113, L.1.) This testimony only

corroborates Mr. Lopez-Orozco's story as told to the detectives in the van.

(Exhibit

187.) Maria Garcia testified as to her understanding of why Mr. Lopez-Orozco was
going to California-he had a shooting with somebody and that he had left somebody
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that was injured or that he had shot someone and left him for dead. (Trial Tr., p.2171,
L.7 -- p.2172, L.5.)

Neither of these two witnesses' testimony corroborates Jose's

testimony that Mr. Lopez-Orozco confessed to killing Becky and the kids. Further, even
the testimony of Liliana Pedroza and Peggy Larios regarding the transfer of gas early in
the morning in the desert-while an unusual favor to ask-does not serve to confirm the
evidence adduced from Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and unsworn statement.
(Trial Tr., pp.1162-1222, 1235-1263.)
The preliminary hearing testimony and unsworn statement was not cumulative
evidence where Jose was the sole witness through whom the State introduced evidence
that Mr. Lopez-Orozco confessed to killing Becky and the kids.

Jose was the sole

witness whose testimony and unsworn statement affirmatively linked Mr. Lopez-Orozco
to the death of Becky and the kids.
Although the State claims that the testimony at trial corroborated Jose's
statement, this is only partially true. While other testimony adduced at trial may have
corroborated insignificant details contained in Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and
unsworn statement, the critical, new information revealed through Jose's preliminary
hearing testimony and unsworn statement-that Mr. Lopez-Orozco had confessed to his
family that he killed Becky and her kids-was only admitted through Jose. The State
refers to Balvina's and Maria Garcia's testimony as corroborating Jose's preliminary
hearing testimony and sworn statement; however, these two witnesses' testimony
added nothing material to Mr. Lopez-Orozco's statement to the officers in the van and
certainly did not corroborate that Mr. Lopez-Orozco told either of them that he killed
Becky and the kids.
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Jose was never cross-examined at trial as he was found to be unavailable. (Trial
Tr., p.2016, L.17- p.2025, L.15, p.2027, L.1 -2074, L.18.) The only cross-examination
of Jose occurred the prior year at the preliminary hearing-and was limited to
establishing the populace of the room and what type of background noises were in the
room during Mr. Lopez-Orozco's purported confession to his family members.

(Trial

Tr., p.2066, L.9 - p.2068, L.24.) Further, the prosecutor's case was missing several key
elements, including a murder weapon (Trial Tr., p.2838, L.14) and a firm motive (see,

e.g., Trial Tr., p.2804, L.16 - p.2806, L.17) (discussing three possible motives for the
murders) and (Trial Tr., p.2839, Ls.7-9) (admitting that there were "a variety of motives
out there").
The error was not harmless because the State failed to produce physical
evidence or corroborating testimony at trial. The State's case lacked physical evidence
such as ONA, fingerprints, ballistics, etc. which would have tied Mr. Lopez-Orozco to the
deaths. Ultimately, the State did not introduce any evidence or testimony which truly
contradicted Mr. Lopez-Orozco's version of events, save for Jose's preliminary hearing
testimony and unsworn statement. Mr. Lopez-Orozco's version of events, as told to the
detectives in the van on the trip from Salt Lake City (Exhibit 187), matched the physical
evidence at the scene-when he last saw Becky and the kids, they were alive and in his
car, but being shot at. Thus State built its case around Mr. Lopez-Orozco's statements
to his family, as overheard by his brother, Jose. As the prosecutor put it, "they [Jose
and Balvina] are the only two people who actually heard the admission from the
defendant's own mouth." (Trial Tr., p.1984, L.25 - p.1985, L.2.) The State pointed out
that "they are the only two witnesses that the State can obtain that information from."
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(Trial Tr., p.1985, Ls.4-5.) The district court agreed with the prosecutor and found "that
realistically in terms of any statement attributed to the defendant in this case as to his
part in the alleged murder in this matter that these two witnesses are the only two that
can provide that evidence." (Trial Tr., p.1993, Ls.15-20.) The jury did not obtain this
information through any other means-only Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and
unswom statement told the jury of Mr. Lopez-Orozco's purported confession to killing
Becky and the kids.
Mr. Lopez-Orozco told a plausible story of what had happened to him and Becky
after they left Becky's dad's house.

(Exhibit 187.) The story was corroborated by

testimony and evidence admitted at trial. The only resounding testimony and evidence
supporting the State's theory of the case-that Mr. Lopez-Orozco killed Becky and her
kids-was the Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and his unsworn statement.
The failure to admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, see also, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

11.
The District Court Erred In Permitting Jose's Unsworn Statement To Be Read To The

ID
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the unsworn statement attributed to Jose

to be read to the jury. The unsworn statement was not prepared by Jose, substantial
time had lapsed between the event and the preparation of the unsworn statement, Jose
never adopted the unsworn statement, and it did not accurately reflect Jose's
knowledge in 2002. Thus, the requisite safeguards to insure the probable accuracy of
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the statement were not present and the district court erred in allowing the statement to
be read to the jury.

B.

The District Court Erred In Permitting Jose's Unsworn Statement To Be Read To
The Jury
The State asserts that Mr. Lopez-Orozco's arguments concerning the unsworn

statement are not preserved. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.) The State is incorrect.
The State asserts that counsel for Mr. Lopez-Orozco objected only to the
statement being admitted as an exhibit.
Tr., p.1979, L.3 -

p.1980, L.8.)

(Respondent's Brief, p.14 (citing Trial

Mr. Lopez-Orozco disagrees with the State's

characterization of counsel's objection, as counsel stated that the State could not "bring
in or (... ] submit on the record in the record the actual statements . . . . "

(Trial

Tr., p.1979, Ls.3-9.) Thus, counsel objected to the evidence altogether. Further, later
in that hearing, counsel for Mr. Lopez-Orozco objected to introduction of the out-of court
declaration in any form, stating, "Judge, I think under [I.R.E.] 803(8) that the
declarations are not admissible as exhibits and they should not come in, either as an
exhibit and/or as verbal testimony." (Trial Tr., p.1987, Ls.19-22.)

Finally, after the arguments from the parties, the district court specifically
addressed the requirements of 1.R.E. 803(5). (Trial Tr., p.1995, L.5 - p.1996, L.25.) As
previously mentioned, when an issue is presented to or decided by the trial court, the
issue is preserved. Duvall, 131 Idaho at 550 (1998) (citing Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co.,

117 Idaho 351, 356-57 (1990). The issue was presented to the trial court, which ruled
on the merits of I.R.E. 803(5). This is the challenge that Mr. Lopez-Orozco is making on
appeal, and the argument is clearly preserved.
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C.

The District Court's Error In Permitting Jose's Unsworn Statement To Be Read
To The Jury Was Not Harmless
The State asserts that any error in the admission of Jose's unswom statement

was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.17-22.) The State is incorrect. The analysis of
the harmfulness in admitting Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and the analysis of
the harmfulness in admitting Jose's unsworn statement are inextricably linked where the
substance of the preliminary hearing testimony essentially explains the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the unsworn statement and the content of the unsworn
statement. (Trial Tr., p.2046, L.13 - p.2074, L.16.) Throughout the trial the testimony
and statement are discussed and referenced together, thus Mr. Lopez-Orozco will
hereby adopt and incorporate by reference his analysis from Section (l)(C) as to the
harmfulness of the admittance of ,Jose's unsworn statement.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lopez-Orozco requests that his convictions be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2015.

SALL'(c<Y. CbOLEY )
Deputy State Appella<e Public Defender

JUST~~
Dep~l_. S e Appellate Public Defender
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